Cyber-physical systems, like Smart Buildings and power plants, have to meet high standards, both in terms of reliability and availability. Such metrics are typically evaluated using Fault trees (FTs) and do not consider maintenance strategies which can significantly improve lifespan and reliability. Fault Maintenance trees (FMTs) -an extension of FTs that also incorporate maintenance and degradation models, are a novel technique that serve as a good planning platform for balancing total costs and dependability of a system. In this work, we apply the FMT formalism to a Smart Building application. We propose a framework for modelling FMTs using probabilistic model checking and present an algorithm for performing abstraction of the FMT in order to reduce the size of its equivalent Continuous Time Markov Chain. This allows us to apply the probabilistic model checking more efficiently. We demonstrate the applicability of our proposed approach by evaluating various dependability metrics and maintenance strategies of a Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning system's FMT.
INTRODUCTION
Worldwide, buildings account for approximately 40% of the total energy consumption and 20% of the total CO 2 emissions, annually [6] . Efficient Building Automation Systems (BAS) can reduce energy consumption by up to 30% through their optimal operation, continuous commissioning and maintenance [6] . Constructions employing such technologies are termed Smart Buildings. High standards have to be adhered by such technologies, both in terms of reliability and availability. One way of achieving this is by employing methods to perform preventative and predictive maintenance actions. Diagnostic and fault detection techniques for Smart Building applications have been developed in [3, 15] . Predictive and preventative maintenance strategies are devised in [2, 5] . However, these techniques preclude availability and reliability measurements and focus only on synthesis of maintenance policies in the presence of degradation and fault finding. Reliability and availability are typically tackled using Fault Trees (FTs), where the focus is on finding the root causes of a system failure using a top-down approach. FTs do not include maintenance strategies in the analysis -a key element in reducing component failures. [14] presents the Fault Maintenance Tree (FMT) as an extension of FT encompassing both degradation and maintenance models. The degradation models represent the different levels of component degradation and are known as Extended Basic Events (EBE). The maintenance models incorporate the undertaken maintenance policy which includes both inspections and repairs. These are modelled using Repair and Inspection modules in the FMT framework.
In literature, FMTs are analysed using Statistical Model Checking technique (SMC) [14] and provide statistical guarantees. In contrast, Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC), based on numerical analysis, provide formal guarantees with higher accuracy when compared with SMC [17] . However, numerical methods are far more memory intensive and may result in a state space explosion. This limitation of PMC often leaves SMC as the last resort [17] . In this paper we tackle the FMT analysis using PMC. Our contributions can be summarised as follows:
(1) We formalise the FMT framework using Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMCs).
(2) We formalise the dependability metrics using the extended Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) formalism such that they can be computed using the PRISM model checker [12] . (3) To mitigate the state space explosion problem, we present an FMT abstraction technique which decomposes a large FMT into an equivalent abstract FMT based on our proposed graph decomposition algorithm. Using our framework, we are able to achieve a 67% reduction in the state space size. (4) Finally, we construct a FMT that identifies failure of a Heating, Ventilation and Air-conditioning system (HVAC). We apply the developed framework to the built FMT and evaluate relevant dependability metrics, together with different maintenance strategies using the PRISM model checker. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyse FMTs using Probabilistic Model Checking and also the first application to Smart Building systems.
This article has the following structure: Section 2 introduces the fault maintenance trees and probabilistic model checking frameworks. This is followed by the developed methodology for modelling FMT using CTMCs and performing model checking in Section 3. The framework is applied to a heating, ventilation and airconditioning (HVAC) case study which is presented in Section 4.
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Fault maintenance trees framework
Fault trees are directed acyclic graphs (DAG) describing the combinations of component failures that lead to system failures. The leaves in the fault trees are called basic events and denote the system failures. The internal nodes of the graph are called gates and describe the different ways that failures can interact to cause other components to fail. The gates in a fault tree can be of several types and these include the AND gate, OR gate, k/N-gate [14] .
Fault maintenance trees (FMT) extend fault trees by including maintenance (all the standard FT gates are also employed by the FMTs). This is achieved by making use of:
(1) Extended Basic Events -The basic events are modified to incorporate degradation models of the component the leaf represents. The degradation models represent different discrete levels of degradations the components can be in and are a function of time. (2) Rate Dependency Events -A new gate introduced in [14] , labelled as RDEP that accelerates the degradation rates of dependent child nodes and is depicted in Figure 1 . When the component connected to the input of the RDEP fails, the degradation rate of the dependent components is accelerated with an acceleration factor γ . (3) Repair and Inspection modules -The repair module (RM) performs cleaning or replacements actions. These actions can be either carried out using fixed time schedules or when enabled by the inspection module (IM). The IM performs periodic inspections and when components fall below a certain degradation threshold a repair or partial replacement is initiated by the IM to be performed by the RM.
Probabilistic model checking
Model checking is a well-established formal verification technique used to verify the correctness of finite-state systems. Given a formal model of the system to be verified in terms of labelled state transitions and the properties to be verified in terms of temporal logic, the model checking algorithm exhaustively and automatically explores all the possible states in a system to verify if the property is satisfiable or not. Probabilistic model checking deals with systems that exhibit stochastic behaviour and is based on the construction and analysis of a probabilistic model of the system. We make use of CTMCs, having both transition and state labels, to perform stochastic modelling. Properties are expressed in the form of extended Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [11] .
Definition 2.1. The tuple C = (S, s 0 , TL, AP, L, R) defines a CTMC which is composed of a set of states S, the initial state s 0 , a finite set of transition labels TL, a finite set of atomic propositions AP, a labelling function L : S → 2 AP and the transition rate matrix R : S × S → R ≥0 . The rate R(s, s ′ ) defines the delay before which a transition between states s and s ′ takes place. If R(s, s ′ ) 0 then the probability that a transition between the states s and s ′ is defined as 1 − e −R(s,s ′ )t where t is time. No transitions will trigger if R(s, s ′ ) = 0.
The logic of CSL specifies state-based properties for CTMCs, built out of propositional logic, a steady-state operator that refers to the stationary probabilities, and a probabilistic operator for reasoning about transient state probabilities. The state formulas are interpreted over states of a CTMC, whereas the path formulas are interpreted over paths in a CTMC. For detail about the syntax and semantics of CSL (which also includes reward formulae), we refer the interested readers to [11] . Examples of a CSL property with its natural language translation are: (i) P ≥0.95 [F complete] -"The probability of the system eventually completing its execution successfully is at least 0.95". (ii) R =? [F success] -"What is the expected reward accumulated before the system successfully terminates?"
FORMALIZING FMTS USING CTMCS
In this section, we first formalise the FMT framework by presenting the formal syntax and semantics for modelling FMTs using CTMCs. Next, we list the set of metrics used to analyse the FMT. Finally, we present the developed framework which allows us to analyse large FMTs using probabilistic model checking (PMC).
FMT Syntax
To formalise the syntax of FMTs using CTMCs, we first define the set F , characterizing each FMT element by type, inputs and rates. We introduce a new element called DELAY which will be used to model the deterministic time delays required by the extended basic events (EBE), repair module (RM) and inspection module (IM). We restrict the set F to contain the EBE, RDEP gate, OR gate, DELAY, RM and IM modules since these will be the components used in the case study presented in Section 4.
Definition 3.1. The set F of FMT elements consists of the following tuples. Here, n, N ∈ N are natural numbers, thresh, in, trig ∈ {0, 1} take binary values, T deд ,T cl n , T r plc , T r ep ,T oh , T insp ∈ R ≥0 are deterministic delays, and γ ∈ R ≥0 is a rate.
• (EBE,T deд ,T cl n ,T r plc , N ) represent the extended basic events with N discrete degradation levels, each of which degrade with a time delay equal to T deд . It also takes as inputs the time taken to restore the EBE to the previous degradation level T cln when cleaning is performed and the time taken to restore the EBE to its initial state T r plc following a replacement action.
• (RDEP, n, γ , in,T deд ) represents the RDEP gate with n dependent children, acceleration rate γ , the input in which activates the gate and T deд the degradation rate of the dependent children.
• (OR, n) represents the OR gate with n inputs.
• (RM, n,T r ep ,T oh ,T insp ,T cl n ,T r plc , thresh, trig) represents the RM module which acts on n EBEs (in our case, this corresponds to all the EBEs in the FMT). The RM can either be triggered periodically to perform a cleaning action, every T r ep delay, or a replacement action, every T oh delay, or by the IM when the delay T insp has elapsed and the thresh condition is met. The time to perform a cleaning action is T cl n , while the time taken to perform a replacement is T r plc . The trig signal ensures that when the component is not in the degraded states, no unnecessary maintenance actions are carried out.
• (I M, n,T insp ,T cl n ,T r plc , thresh) represents the IM module which acts on n EBEs (in our case, this corresponds to all the EBEs in the FMT). The IM initiates a repair depending on the current state of the EBE. Inspections are performed in a periodic manner, every T insp . If during an inspection, the current state of the EBE does not correspond to the new or failed state (i.e. the degradation level of the inspected EBE is below a certain threshold), the thresh signal is activated and is sent to the RM. Once a repair action is performed the IM moves back to the initial state with a delay equal to T cln or T r plc depending on the maintenance action performed.
• (DELAY ,T , N ) represents the DELAY module which takes two inputs representing the deterministic delay T ∈ {T deд , T cln ,T r plc ,T r ep ,T oh ,T insp } to be approximated using an
Erlang distribution with N number of states. This DELAY module can be extended by inclusion of a reset transition label, which when triggered restarts the approximation of the deterministic delay before it has elapsed. The extended DELAY module is referred to as (DELAY ,T , N ) ex t .
The FMT is defined as a special type of directed acyclic graph G = (V , E) where the vertices V represent the gates and the events which represent an occurrence within the system, typically the failure of a subsystem down to an individual component level, and the edges E which represent the connections between vertices. Events can either represent the EBEs or intermediate events which are caused by one or more other events. The event at the top of the FMT is the top event (TE) and corresponds to the event being analysedmodelling the failure of the (sub)system under consideration. The EBE are the leaves of the DAG. For G to be a well-formed FMT, we take the following assumptions (i) vertices are composed of the OR, RDEP gates, (ii) there is only one top event, (iii) RDEP can only be triggered by EBEs and (iv) RM and IM are not part of the DAG tree but are modelled separately 1 . This DAG formulation allows us to propose a framework in Subsection 3.5 such that we can efficiently perform probabilistic model checking.
Definition 3.2.
A fault maintenance tree is a directed acyclic graph G = (V , E) composed of vertices V and edges E.
Semantics of FMT elements
Next, we provide the CTMC semantics for each FMT element f ∈ F . These elements are then instantiated based on the underlying FMT structure to form the semantics of the whole FMT in CTMC form.
DELAY. We define the semantics for the (DELAY ,T , N ) element using Figure 2 (a) and describe the corresponding CTMC using the set of states given by D = {d 0 , d 1 , . . . , d N +1 }, the initial state d 0 , the set of transitions labels TL = {trigger, move}, the set of and
with i representing the current state, j is the next state and µ is a fixed large value corresponding to introducing a negligible delay, which is used to trigger all the DELAY modules at the same time (cf. Definition 2.1). In Figure 2 (b) we define the semantics of (DELAY ,T , N ) ex t . This results in the CTMC described using the state space D = {d 0 , d 1 , . . . , d N +1 }, the initial state d 0 , the set of transition labels TL = {trigger, move, reset}, the set of atomic propositions AP = {T }, the labelling function
= {T } and the rate matrix R where
with i representing the current state and j is the next state. In both instances, the deterministic delays is approximated using an Erlang distribution [8] and all DELAY modules are synchronised to start together using the trigger transition label. The extended DELAY module have the transition labels reset which restarts the Erlang distribution approximation whenever the guard condition is met at a rate of 1 × R sync where R sync is the rate coming from the use of synchronisation with other modules causing the reset to occur ( as explained in Subsection 3.3). This is required when a maintenance action is performed which restores the EBE's state back to the original state and thus restart the degradation process, before the degradation time has elapsed. Remark 1. The basic properties of an Erlang distribution: A random variable Z ∈ R + has an Erlang distribution with k ∈ N stages and a rate λ
where each Y i is exponentially distributed with rate λ. The cumulative density function of the Erlang distribution is characterised using,
and for k = 1, the Erlang distribution simplifies to the exponential distribution. In particular, the sequence Z k ∼ Erlanд(k, λk) converges to the deterministic value 1 λ for large k. Thus, we can approximate a deterministic delay T with a random variable
. Note, there is a trade-off between the accuracy and the resulting blowup in size of the CTMC model for larger values of k (a factor of k increase in the model size) [8, 9] . In this work, the Erlang distribution will be used to model the fixed degradation rates, the maintenance and inspection signals. This is a similar approach taken in [14] where degradation phases are approximated by an (k,λ)-Erlang distribution. Extended Basic Events (EBE). The EBE are the leaves of the FMT and incorporate the component's degradation model. EBE are a function of the total number of degradation steps N considered. Figure 3 shows the semantics of the (EBE,T deд ,T cl n ,T r ep , N = 3). The corresponding CTMC is described by the tuple ({s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 }, s 0 , TL EBE , AP EBE , L EBE , R EBE ) where s 0 is the initial state , TL EBE = {degrade i ∈ {0, ..., N } , perform_clean, perform_replace}, the atomic propositions AP EBE = {new, thresh, failed}, the la- . The deterministic time delays taken as inputs are modelled using three different DELAY modules:
s2 s3 (1) an extended DELAY module approximating T deд with the transition label move replaced with degrade N such that synchronisation between the two CTMCs is performed (explained in Subsection 3.3). When T deд has elapsed the transition labelled with degrade N is triggered and the EBE moves to the next state at a rate equal to N
The reset transition label and corresponding transitions are replicated in extended DELAY module and replaced with perform_clean and perform_replace. When the corresponding maintenance action is performed one of the transition label is triggered and the state of the EBE moves to previous state (if cleaning action is carried out) or to the initial state (if replace action is performed). (2) a DELAY module approximating T cl n with the transition label move replaced with perform_clean. When T cl n has elapsed the transition with transition label perform_clean is triggered and the EBE moves to the previous state at a rate equal to N T cl n . (3) a DELAY module approximating T r plc with the transition label move replaced with perform_replace. When T r plc has elapsed the transition having the transition label perform_replace is triggered and the EBE moves to the initial state at a rate equal to N T r pl c .
The transition labels perform_clean and perform_replace cannot be triggered at the same time and it is assumed thatT cl n T r plc . This is a realistic assumption as only one maintenance action is performed at the same time.
RDEP gate. The RDEP gate has static semantics and is used in combination with the semantics of its n dependent EBEs. When triggered (in = 1), the associated EBE reaches the state labelled failed, the degradation rate of the n dependent children is accelerated by a factor γ . We model the in signal using,
where L(s) is the label of the current state of the associated EBE. Similarly, we map the RDEP gate function using,
where T deд i , i ∈ 1, . . . n corresponds to the degradation rate of the n dependent children. 3 OR gate. The OR gate indicates a failure when either of its input nodes have failed and also does not have semantics itself but is used in combination with the semantics of its n dependent input events (EBEs or intermediate events). We use,
where E i = 1, i ∈ 1 . . . n corresponds to when the n events, connected to the OR gate, represent a failure in the system. In the case of EBEs, E 1 = 1 occurs when the EBE reaches the failed state .
Repair module (RM). Figure 4 (a) shows the semantics of (RM, n, T r ep ,T oh ,T insp ,T cln ,T r plc ,T r plc , thresh, trig). The CTMC is described using the state space {rm 0 , rm 1 }, the initial state rm 0 , the transition labels TL RM = {inspect, check_clean, check_replace, trigger_clean, trigger_replace}, the atomic propositions AP = {maintenance}, the labelling function L(rm 0 ) = {∅}, L(rm 1 ) = {maintenance} and with R I M = 1 1 1 0 . For the sake of clarity in Figure 4 (a), we used the transition labels check_maintenance and trigger_maintenance. The transition label check_maintenance and corresponding transitions are replicated and the transition labels replaced by check_clean or check_replace to allow for both type of maintenance checks. Similarly, the transition label trigger_maintenance and corresponding transitions are duplicated and the transition labels replaced by trigger_clean or trigger_replace to allow the initiation of both type of maintenance actions to be performed. Due to synchronisation, only one of the transitions may trigger at any time instance (as explained in Subsection 3.3). The transition labels trigger_clean or trigger_replace correspond to the transition label trigger within the DELAY module approximating the deterministic delays T cl n and T r plc respectively. The deterministic delays which trigger inspect, check_clean or check_replace correspond to when the time delays T insp ,T r ep and T oh respectively, have elapsed. All these signals are generated using individual DELAY modules with the move transition label for each module replaced using inspect, check_clean or check_replace respectively. The thresh signal is modelled using,
where L(s j,i ), j ∈ 0 . . . N , i ∈ 1 . . . n correspond to the label of the current state j of each of the n EBE. Similarly, we model the trig signal using
Both signals act as guards which when triggered determine which transition to perform (cf. Fig. 4 (a) ).
Inspection module (IM)
. The semantics of the (I M, n,T insp , T cl n ,T r plc , thresh) is depicted in Figure 4 (b). The CTMC is defined using the tuple
The thresh signal corresponds to same signal used by the RM, given using (7). In Figure 4 (b) , for clarity, we use the transition label perform_maintenance. This transition label and corresponding transitions are duplicated and the transition labels are replaced by either perform_clean or perform_replace to allow for both type of maintenance actions to be performed when one of them is triggered using synchronisation. The same DELAY modules used in the RM and EBE to represent the deterministic delays are used by the IM. The DELAY module used to represent the deterministic delays T cl n and T r plc triggers the transition labels perform_clean or perform_replace. This represents that the maintenance action has completed. 
Semantics of FMT
Next, we show how to obtain the semantics of a FMT from the semantics of its elements using the FMT syntax introduced in Subsection 3.1. We define the DAG G by defining the vertices V and the corresponding events E. The leaves of the DAG are the events corresponding to the EBE. The events E are connected to the vertices V , which trigger the corresponding auxiliary function used to represent the semantics of the gates. The Events connected to the RM and IM are initiated by triggering the auxiliary functions thresh and trig given using (7) and (8) respectively. Based on the structure of G, we compute the corresponding CTMC by applying parallel composition of the individual CTMCs representing the elements of the FMT. The parallel composition formulae are derived from [7] and defined as follows, 
where R is given by:
, and s 2
, and
For any pair of states, synchronisation is performed either using interleaving or full synchronisation. For full synchronisation, as in Definitions 3.3, the rate of a synchronous transition is defined as the product of the rates for each transition. The intended rate is specified in one transition and the rate of other transition(s) is specified as 1. For instance, the RM synchronises using full synchronisation with the DELAY modules representing T insp , T r ep and T r plc and therefore, to perform synchronisation between the RM and the DELAY modules, the rates of all the transitions of RM should have a value of 1 (cf. Fig. 4 (a) ), while the rate of the DELAY modules represent the actual rates (cf. Fig 2) . The same principle holds for the EBEs and the IM. We refer the reader to Table 1 to further elucidate the synchronisation between the FMT components and the method employed during the parallel composition.
Example. Consider, a simple example showing the time signals and synchronisations required for modelling an EBE and the RM and IM. The EBE has a degradation rate equal to T deд and we limit the functionality of the RM and IM by allowing only the maintenance action to perform cleaning. We also need the corresponding DELAY modules generating the degradation rates, T deд and the maintenance rates T cln ,T insp ,T r ep . The resulting CTMC is obtained by performing a parallel composition of the components
The synchronisation between the different components is shown in Figure 5 and proceeds as follows:
(1) All the DELAY modules (except T cl n ) start at the same time using the trigger transition label. (2) When the extended DELAY module generating the T deд time delay elapses, the corresponding EBE moves to the next state through synchronisation with the transition label degrade N . (3) The clock signals T r ep ,T insp represent periodic maintenance and inspection actions and when the deterministic delay is reached, through synchronisation with the transition label check_clean or the inspect, the RM or IM modules is triggered (cf. Fig. 4(a) and 4(b) ). If RM triggers a maintenance action, the DELAY representing T cl n is triggered using the synchronisation labels trigger_clean. Once the deterministic delay T cl n elapses, the EBE, the extended DELAY module representing T deд (where the reset transition label within the extended DELAY module is replaced with perform_clean ) and the IM are reset using the transition label perform_clean. Remark 2. One should note that this results in the requirement of a large state space, which is a function of the number of states used to approximate the deterministic delays. Thus, to counteract this effect we propose an abstraction framework in Subsection 3.5.
Metrics
We use PRISM to compute the metrics of the model described in Subsection 2.1. The metrics can be expressed using the extended Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) as follows: 
Decomposition of FMTs
The use of CTMC and deterministic time delays results in the requirement of a large state space for modelling the whole FMT (cf. Remark 2). We therefore propose an approach which decomposes the large FMT into an equivalent abstract CTMC which can be analysed using PRISM. The process involves two transformation steps. First we convert the FMT into the equivalent directed acyclic graph (DAG) and split this graph into a set of smaller sub-graphs. Second, we transform the sub-graphs into the equivalent CTMC by making use of the developed FMT components semantics (cf. Subsec. 3.2), and performing parallel composition of the individual FMT components based on the underlying structure of the subgraph. The smaller sub-graphs are then sequentially recomposed to generate the higher level abstract FMT. Figure 6 depicts a high-level diagram of the decomposition procedure.
Conversion of original FMT to the equivalent graph. The FMT is a DAG (cf. Subsection 3) and in this framework we need to apply a transformation to the DAG in the presence of an RDEP gate, such that we can perform the decomposition. The RDEP causes an acceleration of events on dependent child nodes when the input node fails. In order to capture this feature in a DAG, we need to duplicate the input node such that it is connected directly to the RDEP vertex. This allows us to capture when the failure of the input occurs and the corresponding acceleration of the the children. This is reasonable as the same RM and IM are used irrespective of the underlying FMT structure.
Graph decomposition. We define modules within the DAG as sub-trees composed of at least two events which have no inputs from the rest of the tree and no outputs to the rest except from its output event [13] . We can divide the graph into multiple partitions based on the number of modules making up the DAG. We define the following notations to ease in the description of the algorithm:
• V o indicates whether the node is the top node of the DAG.
• V д indicates the node where graph split is performed.
• Modules correspond to sub-graphs in DAG.
We set V o when we construct the DAG from the FMT and then proceed with executing Algorithm 1. We first identify all the subgraphs within the whole DAG and label all the top nodes of each subgraph i as V T i . We loop through each sub-graph and its immediate child (the sub-graph at immediate lower level) and at the point where the sub-graph and child are connected, the two graphs are split and a new node V д is introduced. Thus, executing Algorithm 1 results in a set of sub-graphs linked together by the labelled nodes V д . For each of lower level sub-graphs we now proceed to compute the mean time to failure (MTTF). This will serve as an input to the higher-level sub-graphs such that metrics for the abstract equivalent CTMC can be computed. PMC of sub-graphs. We start from the bottom level sub-graphs and perform the conversion to CTMC using the formal models presented in Subsection 3.2. The formal models have been built into a library of PRISM modules and based on the underlying components and structure making up the sub-graph, the corresponding individual formal models are converted into the sub-graph's equivalent CTMC by performing parallel composition (cf. Subsec. 3.3). For each sub-graph, we compute the probability of failure D e (T ) at time T , PMC of final equivalent abstract CTMC. On reaching the top level node V o , we compute the metrics for the equivalent abstract CTMC for a specific time horizon T . For different horizons, the previous step of computing the MTTF for the underlying lower level sub-graphs needs to be repeated. Using this technique, we can formally verify larger FMTs, while using less memory and computational time due to significantly smaller state space of the underlying CTMCs. Next, we proceed with an illustrative example comparing the process of directly modelling the large FMT using CTMCs versus the de-compositional modelling procedure. Figure 7 presents the FMT composed of two modules and the corresponding abstracted FMT. The abstract FMT is a pictorial representation of the moel represented by the equivalent abstract CTMC obtained using the developed decomposition framework (cf. Fig. 6 ). For both the large FMT and the equivalent abstract FMT a comparison between the total number of states for the resulting CTMC models, the total time to compute the reliability metric and the resulting reliability metric is performed. All computations are run on an 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 processor with 8GB of RAM and the resulting statistics are listed in space with 63937 states. This corresponds to a 67% reduction in the state space size. The total time to compute the reliability metric is a function of the final time horizon and a maximal 73% reduction in computation time is achieved. Accuracy in the reliability metric of the abstract model is a function of the time horizon. The accuracy of the reliability metric computed by the abstract FMT results in a maximal reduction of 0.61%. 
CASE STUDY
We apply the FMT framework to a Heating, Ventilation and Airconditioning (HVAC) system used to regulate a building's internal environment. The HVAC system under consideration for the FMT analysis is presented in Figure 8 . It is composed of two circuitsthe air flow circuitry and the water circuit. The gas boiler heats up the supply water which is fed into the heat pump. The heat pump transfers the supply water into two sections -the supply air heating and cooling coils and the radiators -via the splitter. The rate of water flowing in the heating coil is controlled using a heating coil valve, while the rate of water flow in the radiator is controlled using a separate valve. The outside air is mixed with the extracted room air temperature via the mixer. This is fed into the heating coil, which warms up the input air to the desired supply air temperature. This air is supplied back, at a rate controlled by the Air Handling unit (AHU) dampers, into the zone via the supply fan. The radiators are directly connected to the water circuitry and transfer the heat from the water into the zone. The return water is then passed through the collector and is returned back to the boiler. Based on this HVAC system we construct the corresponding FMT shown in Figure 9 . The leaves of the tree are EBE with discrete degradation rates computed using Table 3 , approximated by the Erlang distribution where N is the number of degradation phases (k = N for the Erlang distribution) and MTTF is the expected time to failure with MTT F = 1/λ (cf. Remark 1). We choose an acceleration factor γ = 2 for the RDEP gate. The system is periodically repaired every 6 months (T r ep = 182 days) and a major overhaul with a complete replacement of all components is carried out once every 20 years (T oh = 20 × 365 days). Weekly inspections are performed (T insp = 7 days) which return the components back to the previous state. Only cleaning actions are performed when inspections are carried out. The total time to perform a cleaning action is 1 day (T cl n = 1 day), while performing a total replacement of components takes 7 days (T r plc = 7 days). The time timing signals {T r ep ,T oh ,T insp ,T cl n ,T r plc } are all approximated using the Erlang distribution with N = 3. All maintenance actions are performed simultaneously on all components. figure) . The EBE are labelled to correspond to the component failure they represent using the fault index presented in Table 3 
Quantitative results
We make use of the developed framework (cf. Subsec. 3.5) and convert the FMT representing the failure of the HVAC system (cf. Fig.  9 ) into the equivalent abstract CTMC. The abstracted CTMC has a state space of 62779 states. Using our current computing set-up, the complex CTMC representing the whole FMT was not computable as it results in a state space explosion. Highlighting, the advantage of the developed framework. The process is performed over six time horizons N r = {0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25} years with the maintenance policy consisting of periodic cleaning every 6 months, a major overhaul every 20 years and inspections on a weekly basis. For this set-up, the metrics corresponding to the reliability and availability of the HVAC systems over the time horizon are computed and are shown in Figure 10 (b). The maximal time taken to compute a metric using the abstract FMT is 1.47 minutes. It is deduced that both the reliability and availability reduce over time and there is a saturation in the number of maintenance actions which one can perform before the system no longer achieves higher performance in reliability and availability. Next, we compare the total cost of maintenance and the expected number of failures over the time horizon N r = {0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25} years when considering different maintenance strategies, such that we can identify the maintenance strategy that minimises cost and the number of failures over time.
We consider six different maintenance strategies which are listed in Table 4 . The total maintenance cost to perform a repair is 100
[GBP], while a replacement costs 5000 [GBP] . We now compute the total expected maintenance costs and the total expected number of failures for each strategy. These are shown in Figure 11 . The most effective strategy which offers a good trade-off between maintenance costs and the expected number of failures is achieved when repairs are carried out on a yearly basis, replacements are carried out every 20 years and inspections are carried out weekly (corresponding to strategy M 1 ). Furthermore, it can be seen that the frequency of inspections has a large effect on the total number of failures. When the frequency of inspection is low (as in M 4 and M 5 ), the expected number of component failures increases significantly. Note that reducing the periodicity of repairs, as in the case of maintenance strategy M 2 also results in an increase in the expected number of failures. 
Strategy index

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
The paper has presented a methodology for applying probabilistic model checking to FMTs. The FMTs are modelled in the form of CTMCs which simplifies the transformation of FMT into formal models that can be analysed using PRISM. A novel technique for abstracting the equivalent CTMC model is also presented. The novel decomposition procedure tackles the issue of state space explosion and results in a significant reduction in both the state space size and the total time required to compute metrics. The framework has been applied to an HVAC system and the effect of applying different maintenance strategies has been presented. The presented framework can be further enhanced by adding more gates to the PRISM modules library which include the Priority-AND, INHIBIT, k/N gates and to incorporate lumping of states as in [16] , such that the state space can be further reduced.
